In other words, there is no dichotomy between welfare and behavioural components of decision making in neoclassical economics because of revealed preferences (Bernheim & Rangel 2005) 2 . However, there are several studies that have examined the consequences of neoclassical assumptions about human capacities and the consequences of 'revealed preferences'. For example, Berg and Gigerenzer (2010) 3 define neoclassical assumptions as imposing unbounded self-interest, will power and computational ability on individuals. Bernheim and Rangel (2005) 4 have explained that neoclassical assumptions involve coherent preferences, the presence of a preference domain in which preferences can be ordered, fixed life-time preferences and absence of error on the part of the individual concerned.
Introduction
There are several conceptual frameworks and methodological tools to understand how policies to alleviate poverty can be enhanced through the introduction of new variables. Sociology provides an interesting reference to examine the relationship between group identity and social policy through the prism of 'recognition and redistribution' that Nancy Fraser has proposed. From political science, we have the work of Benedict Anderson's 'imagined communities', whose various applications to different types of group solidarity in the global south have yielded rich results. In economics, Amartya Sen's capability framework has expanded our understanding of development to include indicators of opportunity and freedom of social environment. In this context, behavioural economics is one of the most recent tools that uses inferences from psychology to understand human behaviour related to decision making. It uses observation, simulation and control experiments to qualify the assumptions of rationality made in neoclassical economics.
Studies over the last five decades since the formal inception of behavioural economics, have shown that the behavioural inferences are not only more realistic in theory, but also have important application in public policy design and implementation at the point of service delivery. The increasing significance of behavioural application in economics has been recognized by awarding the Nobel memorial prize in economics in 2017 to Richard Thaler, the father of behavioural economics. The two features -experimentation and observation as methodology as well as contribution to public policy delivery -makes behavioural economics more appropriate as a theoretical framework to examine how policies delivered for poverty alleviation are received and can be improved upon, leading to empowerment of the community.
Examining the Neoclassical Model
Standard economic theory uses neoclassical model (also called rational choice model) to understand choices and decision making. Neoclassical model has a set of assumptions about human behaviour. Primarily, the assumption is that individuals are completely rational, i.e., they use well-defined and ordered preferences to maximize their utility. Secondly, these preferences reflect the true costs and benefits of the alternative choices available. Finally, in situations of uncertainty, as more information comes in, individuals are able to update their beliefs about normative principles guiding the methodology of rationality through expected value maximization remains the same in both neoclassical and behavioural economics.
Critiquing Neoclassical Assumptions
Two viewpoints emerge with regard to the neoclassical methodological assumptions of behavioural economics. Scholars like Rabin (1999) 10 and Bernheim & Rangel (2005) 11 argue that normative principles of methodology of behavioural economics ought to be modified for selective application of the revealed preference principle. Even studies that critique the rational choice model fail to challenge this methodology question. For instance, Laibson's (1997) 12 model modifying neoclassical assumption consist of reducing the weights of future acts in favour of the present ones. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 13 have brought in 'other-regarding preference' in addition to self-regarding preference of individuals. Their 'social expected utility model' takes these otherregarding preferences but replicates the same methodology of preference ordering and weighting.
O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006) 14 suggest that will-power problem can be fixed through dis-10 Rabin, M. (1999) . Psychology and economics, Journal of Economic Literature, 36 (1), 11-46. 11 Bernheim, B. D., & Rangel, A. (2005) . Behavioral public economics: Welfare and policy analysis with non-standard decision-makers (No. w11518). National Bureau of Economic Research. 6 incentivizing mechanism like taxation. They cite 'sin tax' as an example of this concept. Binmore and Shaked (2007) 15 critique neoclassical model as a representative of empirical economics in which the conflict of 'fit' and 'prediction' exists. They argue that the only way out of this dilemma is to make out of sample prediction tests with the generalizations of empirical data or theory.
There are several scholars who have suggested a methodological review of neoclassical economics in this context. One of the most prominent and the first among them was Herbert Simon. Simon (1959, p. 279) 16 in his seminal paper on reviewing neoclassical assumptions of economics trenchantly observed that, 'how closely we wish to interweave economics with psychology depends, both on the range of questions we wish to answer and on our assessment of how far we may trust the assumptions of static equilibrium as approximations'. His observation was that there was a need in normative macroeconomics and management science for a fuller theory of the firm to understand the actual processes of making business decisions. He reiterated that the notions of adaptive and satisficing behaviour, drawn largely from psychology, challenge the classical picture of the maximizing entrepreneur. Second, he pointed out that the area of imperfect competition and oligopoly also pose the need for a methodological review.
Various scholars have pointed directions that a methodological review might take. Rabin advocates the use of psychology in economics to enhance the parameters included in the utility function lives. The need for the ecological rationality project is that it performs the 'veridical function' of explaining the decision process alternatively to the rational choice model.
Paternalism as a Regulatory Tool
The question of methodological review in behavioural economics lead to various proposals and among them, the most prominent, choice architecture. Historically, paternalism has been justified under various contexts. In the 19 th century, justification for paternalism rose from the skepticism of certain sections of people to make decisions in their own interests. Camerer et al (2003) 21 discuss the case of groups like 'idiots, minors or married women' who were treated as the wards of the state. The second type of justification for paternalism was in the case of preventing individuals from harmful choices that were detrimental to their long-term interests. Illustration of these regulations were health and safety regulation as well as laws that prevented selling oneself to servitude.
Studies in psychology explain human behaviour through psychological and physiological needs on the one extreme and social institutions on the other. One of the options against direct paternalism is the idea of 'planned behaviour'. Ajzen (1991) 22 demonstrates how the theory of planned behaviour is a useful conceptual framework to predict and understand particular behaviour in specific contexts. Ajzen uses attitudes, subjective norms and perceived control of behaviour as variables to understand behavioural intentions that could predict actual behaviour. He uses a combination of behavioural intentions and perceived control of behaviour to explain variance of behaviour.
Another conceptual frame that some scholars propose attempts to understand irrationality. Jones (2001) 23 has argued that although behavioural insights have implied that there is scope for law to modify its architecture, it is less clear how to design law behaviourally. He proposes three perspectives as a directive. The first step is to develop a theoretical foundation that can adequately encompass both rational and irrational behaviour. One way to do it is to partner both economics and behavioural economics with behavioural biology. Behavioural biology provides important methodological tools, robust theories, and data, useful in gaining deeper insights into the evolutionary forces that shape and influence all behaviour. Second, he proposes that a substantial and important subset of the irrationalities we have long ascribed to cognitive defect should be ascribed, instead, to cognitive design. Those irrationalities are likely to be products of 'time-shifted rationality',i.e. the temporal mismatch between the environment in which natural selection shaped the brain to function and differentiate and the modern environments that technology has only recently enabled human mind to understand.
Third, time-shifted rationality logically implies a principle, which can help us to better explain and predict the comparative difficulties legal frames may encounter in attempting to shift different behaviours. This aids in affording us a framework for estimating the relative steepness of demand curves for various behaviours regulated by law. Thus, it gives an entirely new, modern, and biologically informed perspective on the underlying architecture of law, explaining why some of the larger features have developed as they have, and helping to differentiate between more probable and less probable features of future legal systems.
The idea of choice architecture in which behavioural responses can be anticipated has been proposed and discussed in detail in behavioural economics (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008 24 ; Thaler, 2015) 25 . Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 26 have proposed choice architecture from the social and political priming frameworks that work with difficult choices and unpredictability. They describe the context in which behavioural priming or 'nudges' is beneficial. Their main argument is that in the contexts in which the benefits are in the present and the costs in the future, there is an explicit degree of difficulty in choosing various policy options. In such cases, the scope of using nudge to elicit desirable behaviour is greater. A choice architecture can be created by expecting specific errors and creating design mechanism enabling people to be less error prone. The implicit assumption of choice architecture is that there is a linear pathway from mapping choices to welfare. Their definition is that 'a regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational'. They begin with the assumption that the true costs of various options in a decision setting can be assessed. Secondly, they assume that the true costs of various errors can be ascertained. Finally, they assume that individuals are boundedly rational in a given situation. Within this framework, the authors illustrate how policies can be framed that maximize benefits for the boundedly rational with minimum costs imposed on the fully rational. like the state can take one of the three forms. Primarily, regulations may be enacted with redistributive concerns of transferring wealth from the rich to the poor. An example of such regulation is taxation. In the second case, regulations may aim to increase net social benefits in case of a market failure like externalities due to public goods. An example of regulation of this kind is taxation to create public good infrastructure like roads. Finally, there may also be 'paternalistic' regulations that seek to encourage individuals to make rational decisions in the face of cognitive limitations.
There are various studies that have brought out the limitations of behavioural choice architecture.
Examining retirement savings, consumer credit, and environmental protection, Bubb and Pildes (2014) 35 analyze the social-scientific dimension of behavioural economics and recognize two categories of limitations. First, behavioural economics often artificially excludes traditional regulatory tools, such as direct mandates, from its analysis of policy options. It has also neglected the ways in which behavioural failures interact with traditional market failures and the implications of this policy design. Second, behavioural economics does not properly evaluate how its own regulatory tools actually function on ground. Nudges and choice architecture that behavioural economists have proposed might fail in many circumstances. The default rules so central to behavioural economics are better viewed as preserving the formality of choice for some, while for many individuals, functioning as effective mandates. The view that people can always rationally opt out has led policymakers to set these powerful defaults at the wrong levels, resulting in counterproductive policies.
A number of studies have examined how behavioural policy given in choice architecture or through nudges work on ground. Disney, Le Grand and Atkinson (2013) 36 have examined intrinsic behavioural motivation and concluded that behavioural incentives have a way of crowding in or crowding out intrinsic motivation. In their study, they demonstrate that charging on environmental bad behaviour such as the use of plastic bags crowd in intrinsic motivation to discard plastic bag not only in the store concerned, but also across the behavioural spectrum. Slovic and Väastfjäll (2013) 37 have examined psychic numbing or the situations in which large scale events alter predictable psychological responses. They conclude the need to educate moral intuitions to potential clients. Sah, Cain and Loewenstein (2013) 38 have looked into the perverse effects of some behavioural goods like disclosure and transparency. Examining disclosure of information, the authors observe that having information is different from knowing what to do with it. From the point of view of the advisors, three consequences have been empirically observed when there was disclosure. First, there was strategic exaggeration, i.e., consciously exaggerating the bias in advice when disclosure was present. Second, disclosure creates 'caveat emptor' in the minds of the advisors that they are 'morally licensed' to behave less morally in the subsequent situations after Under these conditions of varying real-world conditions, regulatory nudges by the government and market nudges by private firms have been compared. Abdukadirov (2016) 46 argues that market nudges have the potential to diversify due to the properties of 'customization' and competition.
Critiquing nudge from another angle, Beggs (2016) 47 argues that both the government and the private sector have the opportunity to do either a 'pareto nudge' that is aimed at increasing efficiency or a 'rent-seeking nudge'. One of the core insights of this differentiation is that there 44 may be nudges which are beneficial to the individuals but not profitable to a private firm. This leads to a public-good type of situation. Therefore, there is a lot of scope for government institutions to act as the 'nudger of the last resort'. However, choice architecture framework like nudging requires that the institutions that deal with nudges reflect on the long-term preferences of the individuals, focus on individuals who are not self-aware and deal with situations in which a nudge can replace a more distortionary or expensive policy option like a tax or subsidy.
Choice Architecture as Public Policy
Policy tools are techniques the government uses to achieve policy goals. Public policy formulation begins with policy goals which often use policy directives and policy opportunities to make target populations comply with the goals and engage in other forms of coproduction to promote socially Behavioural economics can be used to design effective prescriptive programs for important economic decisions. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) 50 have demonstrated with the 'save more tomorrow' plan that people commit in advance to allocating a portion of their future salary increases toward retirement savings. As firms switch from 'defined-benefit plans' to 'definedcontribution plans', employees bear more responsibility for making decisions about how much to save. The employees who fail to join the plan or who participate at a very low level save at less than the predicted life cycle savings rates. Behavioural explanations by Thaler and Benartzi (2004) . Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving. Journal of Political Economy, 112 (S1), S164-S187. 51 Ibid, p, S170 should opt for a more aggressive treatment method than those in the initial stages. Finally, the individuals should have stable time preference and adherence to the options that they have taken. Sunstein (2013) 63 uses the conceptual framework of 'misfearing' to inform the impact of cost benefit analysis. Misfearing happens when individuals are afraid of trivial tasks and neglect serious ones (Sunstein, 2013) 64 . Sunstein points out that availability heuristic, informational and reputational cascade, and emotional and probability neglect are the reasons why people succumb to misfearing. Sunstein proposes cost benefit analysis on the grounds of cognitive misfunction, as a tool of regulation.
In a seminal study on financial market participation and decision making, Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler (2013) 65 examine the behavioural limitations such as hyperbolic discounting, inertia and nominal loss aversion that negatively affect asset allocation funds, equity market participation, retirement date funds and lifetime investment patterns. They propose choice architecture as a policy prescription against inertia and errors in savings decisions. The default option in choice architecture, for example, helps employees who take no action to still save for retirement as long as the employer follows the prescription of automatically enrolling the employees to the plan and escalating their deferral rates periodically (Benartzi, Peleg & Thaler, 2013) 66 . Johnson and Goldstein (2013) 67 have examined at default choices in decisions regarding organ donation, retirement savings, insurance, internet private policy and sex education policies in American context. They classify defaults as benign, random, personalized, persistent and smart defaults.
They argue that default options significantly reduce effort through implied endorsement and sending reference for action. Thaler, Sunstein and Balz (2013) 68 have analyzed choice architecture as a frame to pre-empt expected errors, give feedback, structure welfare in choices and include incentives in a choice architecture.
Environmental problems are those that evoke less visceral reactions than others. In an earlier work, Sunstein (2006) 69 had shown that people's affective reaction to risk did not match the objective assessment of risks that statistically demonstrated the unpredictability of the outcomes or likelihood of adverse consequences. In psychology, Slovic (1997) 70 anchoring, framing, hot-cold emotional gap, addiction issues, interventions regarding financial and public health habits as probable research fields. They also proposed process routes by which behavioural insights can be incorporated into the policy. Their first suggestion was 'grassroots' approach through which community behaviour is changed to reflect the behavioural insight. The second and third method is to make behavioural insights a part of core economic policy and law.
Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shafir (2004 77 ; 2006) 78 have shown that poor people tend to make similar kinds of decision errors but the circumstance of poverty impose greater costs on these errors than in other situations. In addition to this, people who are better-off are operating in a system that strives to reduce behavioural errors through no-fee options, reminders and default options where as poor people face institutional, social and psychological barriers that make their 87 . The fourth set of factors are the cognitive principles of behavioural economics such as risk seeking in times of loss (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) 88 , loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman 1991) 89 and mental accounting (Thaler 1985) 90 .
These characteristics go against the assumptions of neoclassical economics. For example, mental accounting is a practice that contradicts the idea that money is fungible. Due to such cognitive barriers, behavioural policy should take into account processes like creating correct channels of communication, appealing to the right identities and creating helpful infrastructure to process information.
The third concept that is much studied in behavioural developmental economics is the idea of rationality that is influenced by the environment. Smith (2005) 91 has theorized on the difference between the rationalities of wealth maximization and that of survival. He argues that the first concept of a rational order derived from the standard socioeconomic science models is an example 86 Lewin, K. (1951) . Field Theory in Social Science. New York: Harper.
of what Hayek has called 'constructivism', which stems particularly from philosophers who believed and argued that all worthwhile social institutions were and ought to be created by conscious deductive processes of human reason. In the 17 th century, its proponent was Descartes while in the 19th century, Bentham and John Stuart Mill were among the leading constructivists.
Constructivism used reason to deliberately create rules of action, and designed human socioeconomic institutions that yielded outcomes deemed preferable, given particular circumstances, relative to those produced by alternative arrangements. The shortcoming of constructivism was that human institutions and most decision making was not guided only or even primarily by constructivism. Emergent arrangements, even if initially constructivist in form must have survival properties that take account of opportunity costs and environmental challenges invisible to our modeling efforts.
Smith argues that these considerations led to the second concept of a rational social order, i.e., an ecological system, which emerges out of cultural and biological evolutionary processes, home grown principles of action, norms, traditions, and 'morality'. Ecological processes help in the process of selection. For example, in experimental economics revealed processes such as the continuous double auction (CDA) emerge in numerous studies of existing market institutions.
People in these experiments are led to promote group welfare enhancing social ends that are not part of their original intention. This principle is supported by hundreds of experiments whose environments and institutions (sealed bid, posted offer and others besides CDA) may exceed the capacity of formal game-theoretic analysis to articulate predictive models. But they do not exceed the functional capacity of collectives of incompletely informed human decision makers, whose autonomic mental algorithms coordinate behaviour through the rules of the institutions and social algorithm to generate high levels of measured performance. Smith (2005) where identity is a central concern in psycho-sociological approach in a 'social tension system' in also suggest that policy initiatives based soft-paternalism should be preceded by an analysis of costs and benefits and on design that recognizes consumer heterogeneity. They explain how pilot programs could be an effective way forward to gauge policy effectiveness.
Baickar, Congdon and Mullainathan (2012) 100 use the psychology of decision making to health insurance in the American context. They argue that psychological insights simplify both the nature of the problem (including barriers to enrollment and socially optimal coverage patterns) and the effectiveness of different policy solutions (including overall take-up and targeting of particular populations). For example, employer depended insurance and reference dependent prescription lead to low take-up of insurance cover because of commitment issue and free-rider problems.
Fewer choice options and decision inertia plague these insurance policies although the provisions of these policies are beneficial to the poor sections. Simple behavioural design solution like nudging, selection and non-group insurance may be more effective. Burks, Carpenter, Götte, and Rustichini (2009) 105 found that in addition to choosing larger, later payments in the lab, truck drivers with better performance on cognitive tests are more likely to keep their job long enough to avoid incurring a costly debt for training. Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and Ruthven (2009) 106 collected detailed 'financial diaries' from poor households in Bangladesh, India, and South Africa, documenting the complexity and difficulty of the intertemporal financial decisions that the poor must make to manage their small and irregular incomes.
Temptation goods are defined to be the set of goods that generate positive utility for the self that consumes them, but not for any previous self that anticipates that they will be consumed in the future. In their work comparing temptation good and decision making in poor, Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) 107 argue that the relation between temptations and the level of consumption plays a key role in explaining the observed behaviours of the poor. The assumption of declining temptations, which says that the fraction of the marginal dollar that is spent on temptation goods decreases with overall consumption, has a number of striking implications for the investment, savings, borrowing and risk-taking behaviour of the poor, which would not arise if temptations were either non-declining or entirely absent.
In a field experiment among pension recipients in Cape Town, consumption declines less steeply across the pension month among participants who show more cognitive ability on a workingmemory test (Spears, 2012) 108 . Spears (2011) 109 based on three randomized and partially randomized control experiments demonstrated that poverty is associated with diminished behavioural control.
Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir and Zhao (2013) 110 have demonstrated through cognitive experiments that poverty significantly reduces cognitive performance. In a set of two experiments, thought stimuli about finances were given to poor and well-off participants. The poor participants showed significantly less capability than the rich. Similarly, in the second experiment with a set of farmers, the same participants exhibited increased cognitive performance after their harvest when they were richer than before the harvest. The magnitude of impact on the 'cognitive load' that poverty imposes is significantly high as shown by sleep researchers. Statistical average in a population equates financial concerns as having a pressure equal to losing a night of sleep or approximately 13 IQ points. public policy, behavioural insights have been implemented in lab conditions and pilot projects to combat various types of cognitive limitations. Studies have been conducted on biases, the role of experts, decision making as individuals and in groups. However, there have also been criticism against behavioural economics on two grounds. The first is that behavioural results from lab conditions play out very differently in the field due to various reasons. The second line of critique is because there is genuine difficulty in implementing asymmetric paternalism as a systematic method of policy under all circumstances.
It is in this context, that the third part of the article (the first part deals with critiquing neoclassical model and the second part discusses aspects of behavioural economics) dealt with a special field of enquiry within the discipline of behavioural economics called behavioural developmental economics. Various studies have shown the cognitive burden that a condition of scarcity like poverty imposes on individual decision-making capabilities. This acute cognitive limitation calls for sensitive and insightful policy architecture in which decision making in poverty can be better understood and enhanced towards welfare maximizing goals.
